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UNIVERSALITY AND RELATIVITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
AMERICAN RELATIVISM
Johan D. an der ljver
The United Nations Organization was established in 1945 on the basis
of "faith in fundamental human rights."' It furthermore commited itself to
promoting "univrsa respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion."' Member States solemnly pledged themselves "to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organization" for the achievement of
that commitment'
In the firsttwenty years of its existence, the United Nations in its human
rights agenda concentrated on norm creation. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights4 afforded substance to the concepts of human rights and
fundamental freedoms and served as the basis ofexpandingthe exact meaning
of those concepts even further. In retrospect, it is fair to conclude that the
Organization in those formative years succeeded in mustering universal support
for the affirmation of faith in human rights. Louis Henkin was perfectly right in
proclaiming that, "[t]he idea of human rights is accepted in principle by all
governments regardless of other ideology, regardless of political, economic, or
social condition."'
All nations, large and small, those with commendable as well as the ones
with deplorable track-records in honoring the Organization's objective of
promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all...",6 are adidem in their stated commitment to
the ideals embodied in the doctrine of human rights.
Jacques Maritain long ago sought to identify a certain public morality
within a democratically constructed body politic, which he depicted as a kind of
"civic or secular faith."7 Perhaps a similar communal ethos, founded on the
principle of human rights, has come to signify an international "secular faith." In
I.T. Cohen Professor of International Lawand Human Rights, Emory University.
U.N. CHARTER preamble.
2 Id art. 55(c) (emphasis added).
SId art. 56.
4 GA Res. 217A(111), at71, U.N. Doc.A/8 10 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
s Louis HENKIN, THE RiGHTs OF MAN TODAY 28 (1978).
6 U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
7 JACQUES MAWITAIN, MANANDTHESTATE I10-11 (1951).
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that sense, Robert Traer unconditionally affirmed With in human rights" to be "a
global concept.'
The universal appeal of human rights thinking also penetrated the world
of religious institutions. In his informative survey, Faih in Human Fghts, Traer
set out to demonstrate that, "human rights are the center of a global moral
language that is being justified, elaborated, and advocated by members of
different religious traditions and cutures;"gand he went on to proclaim:
This is true not merely in the West but also in Africa and Asia.
It is true not only in the Frst and Second Worlds, where liberal
and socialist human rights theories have evolved, but in the
Third World as well. Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, and advocates of religious traditions indigenous to
Africa and Asia fundamentally agree about human rights.' °
In fact, it would be fair to endorse the judgment of Louis Henkin that "all the
major religions proudly lay claim to fathering ' human rights" - but they do so on
their own terms.
True enough, governments and religions alike would not want to be
seen to contradict the salient appeal of human rights; yet, this universal
adherence to its demands to a large extent signifies no more than rhetorical
consensus.
Two distinct rivalries have in recent years come to dominate the
international discourse on human rights, designated, more or less, by the North-
South and East-West divides respectively.
The polemics of South versus North are centered upon the question
of economic and social demands. Emphasis in the developed regions of the
world on the so-called first-generation freedom rights provoked resentment of
the developing South, whose main concerns are focused on the second-
generation economic and social rights, and, as a matter of overriding urgency, on
the third-generation right to development Dr. RFJ. Vincent thus depicted the
debate about human rights in North-South relations as a dispute between the
"haves and the "have-nots" ofthe world and one where "individualism and liberty
B ROBERT TRAER, FAIn IN HuMAN RiGHTS 216 (199 1).
9 ld.at 10.
10 Id.
11See HENION, supra note 5, at xii.
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are ranged against collectivism; civil and political rights against economic and
social rights. " '2
Atthe same time there is a new rivalry looming in international politics,
initiated, it seems, by religious forces and founded, approximately, on an East-
West contingent' 3 Here, the dispute is not centered upon the divergence of
economic structures, but instead on the global salience of a particular perception
of human rights. Eastern political forces, with Islam in the lead, are increasingly
questioning the Western perceptions of human rights and challenging the claim
to prime authenticity of the liberal individualistic nuance of the human rights
ideology as devised and understood in the West.
I. UNIVERSALUTYVERsUS RELATMSM
Within the United Nations, the struggle for supremacy of different
human rights perceptions has been marginally addressed in the debate over the
universality of human rights.
At the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, held in
Vienna, Austria in June of 1993, the problem of universality, indivisibility and
interdependence of human rights was identified as an important stumbling block
in East-West relations in the context of resentment by Muslim-led "spoilers"4
regarding attempts to enforce the typical Western perceptions of human rights
throughoutthe world. 5 The East-West disputes that surfaced in Vienna acquired
12 R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RiGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 76 (1986); see ako
Rajni Kothari, Human Rghts as a Nort-South Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNIY: iSSuEsANDAC~oNs 134 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bums H. Weston eds.,
1992).
11 See Peter Leuprecht, Conict Preenfibn and Altematie Forms of Dispute
Resolu on, in HUMAN RIGFTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. A GLOBAL CHALLENGE
959,963 Q(thleen E Mahoneyet al. eds., 1993) (singling out religious fundamentalism -
not to be limited to Muslim fundamentalism - as one of several threats to the cause of
human rights).
" Noticeable leaders in this field were Syria, Ubya, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India,
Burma, Cina, Indonesia, Malysiaand Cuba (mostly supported by Mexico and Colombia).
"s Mr. Adrien-Qaud Zoller, Director of the Geneva-based International Service
Commission, published a particularly informative article outlining the events and
controversies that attended the prelude to the World Conference. Se Zoller, The
Polftcal Context ofthe World Conference, 21 HUm. RTs. MoNrrOR 2, 2-4 (1993).
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a particular dimension through their entanglement in the problem of religious
fundamentalism. Particularly relevant in the present context are the conflicting
views pertaining to the question of the universality of human rights.
The principle proclaimingthe universality of human rights is founded on
the notion that all human rights apply uniformly and with equal force throughout
the world. Thus, it opposes the doctrine of the so-called relativity of human
rights, which maintains that in the application of human rights in concrete
situations, allowance should be made for particularities that attend cultural, ethnic
or religious varieties. The principle of universality thus addresses the assumption
that distinct cultural traditions or religious tenets provide justification for the denial
to individual members of a group of certain basic human rights. It censures
"adaptations" of human rights to suit non-libertarian practices founded on
customs within indigenous, ethnic or religious communities.
Although the United Nations, in the practical application of human rights
principles, is evidently sensitive to ethnic, cultural and religious peculiarities, it
does so only within the peripheral of basic human rights values. The Vienna Final
Act thus proclaims:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent
and interrelated. The intemational community must treat
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same
footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights.'6
This raises the question as to the relationship between, on the one hand, the
universality principle and the notion of 'a margin of appreciation" in' the
implementation of human rights, and of the right to self-determination of national
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, on the other.
A The /'a n of Appredation
The European Commission and Court of Human Rights, charged with
the implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
16 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/CONF 157/23 (1993) at (Part I) 115.
Vol. 4
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 17 have developed a practice
permitting High Contracting Parties to the European Convention 'a margin of
appreciation" in applying Convention norms within their respective jurisdictions."
In the Lawless Case, Sir Humphrey Waldock, President of the Commission of
Human Rights, while explaining to the Court the position taken by the
Commission in the matter, outlined the doctrine of a margin of appreciation in
the context of state security considerations:
The concept behind the doctrine is that Article 15 [dealing with
derogations in times of war or other public emergency] has to
be read in the context ofthe rather spedal subject-matter with
which it deals; namely the responsibilities of a government for
maintaining law and order in times of war or public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. The concept of margin of
appreciation is that a governments discharge of these
responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating
complex factors and balancing conflicting considerations of the
public interest; and that, once the Commission or the Court is
satisfied that the Government's appreciation is at least on the
margin ofthe powers conferred byArticle 15, then the interest
which the public itself has in effective govemrnment and in the
maintenance of order justifies and requires a decision in favour
of the legality of the Governments appreciation.' 9
In the Handside Case, which concerned the legality under the
European Convention of the Applicant's conviction under Britain's Obscene
Publications Act 1959/1964, the doctrine was explained as follows:
48 .... The Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in
the first place, the task of securing the rights and freedoms it
enshrines ....
[lit is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various
'7 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].18 See generall/"PIErER VAN DIJK & GJ.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACnCE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS 585-606 (2d ed. 1990).
9 Lawless v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (196 1).
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Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.
The viewtaken bytheir respective laws of the requirements of
morals varies from time to time and from place to place,
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-
reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position
than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of these requirements as well as on the "necessity" of
a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them. ...
Consequently, Article 10 § 2 [dealing with derogation from
freedom of expression] leaves the Contracting States a margin
of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic
legislature C'prescribed by law) and to the bodies, judicial
amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the
laws in force...
49. Nevertheless, Article 10 § 2 does not give the Contracting
States an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court, which,
with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the
observance of those States' engagements (Artide 19), is
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a "restriction"
or "penalty" is reconcilable with freedom of expression as
protected byArticle 10. The domestic margin of appreciation
thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such
supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged
and its "necessity"; it covers not only the basic legislation but
also the decision applying it. even one given by an independent
court.20
Janis & Kay explained the basis of the doctrine as follows:
Underlying the doctrine of a margin of appreciation are two
assumptions: First, what is necessary to serve interests may
vary from state to state even in "democratic societies"; and,
2o The Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23 (1976).
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second, a govemmenTs estimate of that necessity is entitled to
some deference by an international court, presumably less
familiar with the relevant circumstances.2'
It should be noted that Strasbourg jurisprudence does not reflect
consistency in applyingthe doctrine of a margin of appreciation, and each opinion
and judgment should therefore be carefully scrutinized in order to establish the
extent to which pluralistic considerations might have influenced the outcome.
The Sunday Tlmes Case is often quoted as one in which the Court was
less indulgent in permitting a margin of appreciation.' Following the thalidomide
catastrophy of 1959 to 1962, and while civil actions relating to the tragedy were
still in progress and being contemplated, the London Sunday Times published an
article entitled, "Our Thalidomide Children: A Cause for National Shame." A
follow-up article was forestalled by a court judgment founded on contempt of
court (the subjudice rule). The matter eventually came before the Strasbourg
tribunals. The European Court of Human Rights, upholdingthe opinion of the
European Commission of Human Rights, gave judgment for the Sunday Times.
The Court, referring to its earlier judgment in the Handside Case,' reiterated
thatthe initial responsibility for securing the rights and freedoms enshrined in the
European Convention lies with the High Contracting Parties.24 The Court
further recognized that while certain articles in the Convention leave the High
Contracting Parties a margin of appreciation in limiting particular rights and
freedoms in order to accommodate their own needs with respect to, for
instance, national security, territorial integrity, public safety, or impartiality of the
judiciary, the said margin of appreciation was not unlimited. In the final analysis
such derogations are subjectto the supervision of, and a final ruling by, the Court
as to whether they are warranted within the meaning of the Convention.
The margin of appreciation sanctioned by the European human rights
system cannot be invoked to avoid implementation of any particular right, or
even to redefine the right with a view to regional or cultural preferences. A
margin of appreciation applies exclusively to the prescribed circumstances that
maywanartthe limitation ofaright if, for example, freedom of expression may
be subjected to limitations "in the interest of national security' or 'for the
21 MARK W.JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HumAN RiGHTS LAW 244 (1990).
' SeegeneralThe Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at I (1979).
2 See id at 35-37.
24 See id. at 36.
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protection of health and morats, ' High Contracting Parties will be permitted
some leeway in evaluating the national security situation, or the demands of
health and morality, that might require the concerned freedom to be curtailed.
Theirjudgment is, however, subjectto scrutiny by the enforcement organs of the
human rights regime underwhich the margin of appreciation is exercised. Those
enforcement organs will be particularly vigilant to ensure that the limitations
imposed are proportional to the contingency, in our example, of national
security, health, or morals that prompted their imposition.
The doctrine ofthe margin of appreciation, therefore, does not support
the relativist position; it cannot be relied upon to negate particular rights, or even
to afford an interpolated meaning to the general concept of human rights or to
any of its particular manifestations. The margin of appreciation sanctioned by
European human rights law simply affords a limited discretion to High
Contracting Parties as to how the limitation of Convention provisions, where
applicable, can best be imposed under the prevailing circumstances within their
respective areas of jurisdiction.
B. The ght to Se/-Determinaron
Religious, ethnic and cultural minorities have come to be recognized in
public international law as "peoples" that have a right to self-determination.
Other categories of peoples may also possess a right to self-determination,26 but
' European Convention, supra note 17, art. 10(2).
2 Four quite distinct meanings of the right to self-determination can be distinguished,
determined in each instance bythe identity of the "peoples" that emerged as repositories
of the right:
(i) Initially, when World War I was drawing to a dose, the idea of self-determination of
peoples was advanced to legitimize the disintegration of the world empires of the
time, and within that meaning entailed the right of "peoples" in the sense of
(territorially defined) nations to political independence.
(i® FolowingWorld War II, the emphasis of the concept of self-determination shifted to
the principle of decolonization, the repositories of the concerned right now being
colonized peoples and the substance of their right denoting political independence
from foreign domination or colonial rule.
@i) In the 196(Ys, yet another catagory of"peoples" came to be identified, namely those
subject to racist r6gimes, and here the concept substantively denoted the right of
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the concern here is with the concept of self-determination as applied to religious,
ethnic or cultural minorities.
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities27 speaks of 'the right [of national or
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in
public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.'
Governments, through their respective constitutional and legal systems,
oughtto secure the interests of distinct sections of the population that constitute
minorities in the above sense. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities dearly spells
out that obligation: protect, and encourage conditions for the promotion of the
concerned group identities of minorities under the jurisdiction of the duty-bound
state;2  afford to minorities the special competence to participate effectively in
decisions pertinent to the group to which they belong;29 do not discriminate in
any way against any person on the basis of their group identity,3" and, in fact, take
action to secure their equal treatment by and before the law,3 and so on.
It must be emphasized that self-determination in this context does not
mean a right to political independence, ora so-called right of the group as such
to participate in the structures of government. After all, the establishment of a
new state by means of secession applies to a particular territory,32 while the right
such peoples to participate in the structures of government within the countries to
which they belonged.
(iv) Finally, the right to self-determination has been extended to national or ethnic,
cultural, religious and linguistic minorifies whose particular entitlements are centered
upon a right to le according to the traditions and customs of the concerned group.
2GA Res.47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. Supp. No. 49, at 212, U.N. Doc. N47/49
(1992) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Persons].
' See id arts. 1.1,4.2.
29 See id art. 2.3.
30 See id. art. 3.
31 See id art. 4. 1.
' According to Hermann Mosler, Is]tates are constituted by a people, living in a
territory and organized by a government which exercises territorial and personal
jurisdiction." Hermann Mosler, StA4&ts of/ntemaonaLaw, 7 ENCTCLOPEDA OF PUBUc
INTERNATIONAL LAW 442,449 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984). Karl Doehring defined a
state in international law as "an entity having exclusive jurisdiction with regard to its
territory and personal jurisdiction in view of its nationals." Karl Doehring, State, 10
52 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 4
to self-determination belongs to a "people." Accordingly, international
instruments proclaiming the right to self-determination almost invariably
postulates inviolability of the tenitorial integrity of existing states,33 and reconciling
the two principles in question necessarily means that self-determination must be
taken to denote something less than secession. Self-determination of people is
a matter of autonomy in relation to sectional interests of such groups and not of
sovereignty in the sense of national independence. International law has been
quite adamant in proclaiming the sanctity of post-World War II national
borders,34 and in censuring attempts at secession in instances such as Katanga,
Biakara and the Turkish Republic of Northem Cyprus.3" As explained by Vernon
van Dyke, "the United Nations would be in an extremely difficult position if it
were to interpret the right to self-determination in such a way as to invite or
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (Rudolf Bemhardt, ed., 1987).
Herman Dooyeweerd deined the bundational function of a state in terms of"an internal
monopolistic organization ofthe power ofthe sword over a particular cultural area within
territorial boundaries." HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, III, A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL
THOUGHT 414 (1969). He further maintained that the leading or qualiying function of
the state frids expression in a public legal relationship which unifies the govemment, the
people and the territory constituting the political community into a politico-juridical
whole. See i. at 433.
' See, e.g., Final Act ofthe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug.
I, 1975, arts. IV, VIII, 14 I.LM. 1292, 1294 [hereinafter Final Act].
34 See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POucAL OGANS OFTHE UNITED NATIONS, 104-05 (1963). See, e.g., Final Act, supra,
note 33; Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. I11, para. 3,
2 I.ILM. 766,767-68 (committing Member States to adhere to the principle of'respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to
independent exstence); and, in furtherance of this principle, a Resolution adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Cairo in 1964 called on all Member
States of the Organization of African Unity "to respect the borders exsting on their
achievement of national independence." (reprinted in IAN BROWNUE, AFRICAN
BOUNDARIES:A LEGALAND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 10-1 (1979)).
' See Johan D. van der Vyver, Soverefgnty and Human R'ghts in Consthtt'onal and
Inta t Law" 5 EMORY INTL L REV. 321,403-07 (199 1) [hereinafter van der Vyer,
Sovereignty and Human Rghts]; and in greater detail, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263-266 (1979); see JOHN DUGARD,
RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 86-90 (Katanga), 84-85 (Biafra) and 108-I I I
(Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) (1987); seeJohan D. van der Vyver, Statehood
in Intemaional Law, 5 EMORY INTVL L REV., 9, 35-37 (Katanga) and 42-44 (Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus) (199 1) [hereinafter van der Vyver, Statehood].
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jusliy attacks on the territorial integrity of its own members. 6 The Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Unguistic
Minorities37 reiterated that its provisions must not be taken to contradict the
principles of the United Nations pertaining to, inter alia, "sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and political independence of States.'
In tem-s of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations," secession (or the restructuring of national
frontiers) will indeed be lawful, provided the decision to secede is "freely
determined by a people," 9 that is, it is submitted, a cross-section of the entire
population ofthe state to be divided and not only of the inhabitants of the region
wishing to secede.4" On that basis alone, could the United Nations find peace
with the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union4 '
and of Czechoslovakia?2
36 VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY
102(1970).
17 Declaration on the Rights of Persons, supra note 27, art. 8.4.
GA. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAO.R., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 12 1, U.N. Doc.
A8028 (1970).
Id The Dedaration provides, under the heading: "The Principle of Equal Rights and
Self-Determination of Peoples': "The establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right to self-determination bythat people.* Id.
4 johan Heunis lost sight ofths truism when arguing that the establishment of the South
African (racially defined) homeland states (the TBVC-countries) occured in conformity
with the right to self-determination. SeejoHAN HEUNIS, UNITED NATIONS VERSUS SourH
AnF~cA328-30 (1986). See also HERCULES BOOYSEN, VOLIEREG 67 (1980); See van der
Vyver, Statehood, supra note 35 at 102 n.354 (for a critical comment on the
Heunis/Booysen argument).
", It should be specially noted that the U.S.S.R. Constitution expressly guaranteed the
right of each Republicto secede from the Union. See U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 72, reprinted
in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD (William B. Simons ed. 1980).
4 Lee Buchheit specified, as elements for legitimizing secession in any given case, that the
section of a community seeking partition should possess a distinct group identity with
reference to, for example, cultural, racial, linguistic, historical or religious considerations;
those making a separatist claim must be capable of an independent existence, including
economic viabiTity (but bearing in mind international aid programs that might help a newly
established political entity over its teething problems); and the secession must serve to
promote general international harmony, or at least not be disruptive of international
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The establishment of a new state through secession will also be
recognized in international law if distinct territories of an existing state in a peace
treaty following armed conflict should agree to part ways. The secession of
Eritrea from Ethiopia received international sanction on this basis.
Secession is thus authorized by international law in two instances only:
ifra decision to secede is "freely determined by a people"-that
is, it is submitted, a cross-section of the entire population of the
state to be divided and not only inhabitants of the region
wishing to secede; and
if, following armed conflict, national boundaries are redrawn as
part of the peace treaty.
The parting of constitutional ways of the Czech and Slovak Republics
may serve as an example of the creation of new states under the first rule
stipulated above, while the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia exemplifies the
second. The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia represents a complicated
conglomeration of both principles.
Self-determination also does not support relativism in the selection,
interpretation or application of the norms of human rights protection. The right
to self-determination, as currently perceived in international law, deals with
minorities within a body politic and not with particular nations, or religiously
defined states. But, even if one were to extend the principle of self-
determination through analogical interpretation to comprise such political
errttites,4 the right would still remain confined within the endave of human rights
directives. That, exactly, is what the Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Unguistic Minorties mandates in
harmony or disrupt it more than the status quo is likely to do. See LEE BUCHHErr,
SECESSION: THE LEGmMING OF SELF- DETERmINATION 228-38 (1978).
43 SeeANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRISA. 359-
63(1995).
4 Jack Donnelly maintained that cultural relativism is based on the principle of self-
determination of peoples. SeeJack Donnelly, CuturaRelaism and UnAersalHuman
Rghts 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 400,410-16(1984). In doing so, he did not attempt to come
to grips with the technical meaning of self-determination in international law. His
proposition must therefore be taken to represent no more than a loose choice of
terminology and not as a considered exposition of the concept of self-determination as
such.
Vol. 4
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positive language when it proclaims:
States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their
characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion,
traditions and customs, except where specific practices are in
violation of national law and contrary to international
standards.45
It is submitted thatthe national law limitation is to be conditioned by the
international standards criterion; it presupposes municipal regulation that
remains within the confines of international standards and does not place undue
restrictions upon the sphere sovereignty of minorities.
In other words, the repositories of self-determination have a right to live
their lives according to their own established customs and traditions, or in the
case of religious communities, according to the demands of their belief, but only
insofar as those customs, traditions or beliefs do not violate the basic norms of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. This principle of international law is
neatly encapsulated in the Constitution of the world's youngest democracy, the
Republic of South AfMica:
(I) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic
community may not be denied the right, with other members
of their community, to-
(a) enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their
language; and
(b) form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic
associations and other organs of civil society.
(2) This right may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with any other provision of the Bill of Rights.46
4s The Declaration of the Rights of Persons, supra note 27, art. 4.2.
46 S. AFR. CoNST. § 3 1.
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II. RELATMSM REvISITED
A relativistic approach to problems of law is not confined to the domain
of international human rights. One can, and should, distinguish between
relativism in perceptions of the law per se, relativism in the context of the
constitutional protection of human ights, and relativism in the interpretation and
application of international human rights standards.
A JurisprudenialRelabw'sm
Contemporary theories of natural law include a particular variety that
perceives the law as being held captive in a relativistic mold. Gustav Radbruch
(1878-1949) and Lon L Fuller (1902- ) may be singled out as representatives
of this brand of legal philosophy.
PRadbruch, in the later phase of his philosophical development,4 z was a
memberofthe Neo-Kantian School of FreiburgfBaden 49 that placed special stress
on values within the construct of the law,49 and did so from the perspective of
legal relativism."0
The legal idea, said Radbruch, embodies within itself three basic value
4 Radbruch's post World War II philosophy differed markedly from his earlier writings.
4 Neo-Kantian philosophy is commonly divided into the Marburg School (which
emphasized the natural sciences, the domain of the Seif) and the Baden)Freiburg School
(which focussed its analyses on the humanities, the area of So//en). Radbruch was a
professor of law in the University of Heidelberg.
"' Radbruch thus referred to a contemporary tendency of his time to regard philosophy
as a'Vience of what ought to be." CWissenschaft von der Werten ... Wissenschaft vom
Sollen ... '). GLtTAV RADBRUH,VOMCHU DER RECTrIsPHILOSOPHIE 19 (1959). Legal
philosophy as such "deals with the value and purpose of the law, the idea of law and with
the ideal law, and it continues in Legal Politics, which has as its subject-matter the
practicality of the ideal law." ("Sie handelt also von den Werten und Zielen des Rechts,
von der Idee des Rechts und vom idealen Recht, und lndet ihre Fortsetzung in der
Rechtspolitik, welche die Verwirklichungsm6glichkeiten des idealen Recht zu ihrem
Gegenstand hat.'!). Id.
I" Wolfgang Friedmann descibed the relativism of Radbruch's legal philosophy as follows:
'This legal relativism is... concerned with the ultimate meaning of legal systems but does
not see its task in suggesting a choice between opposite values. The choice is a matter
for personal decision; a matter not of science but of conscience. Relativism does not
evade political decisions, but does not wish to give them a scientific doak." WOLFGANG
FRJEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 192 (1967).
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structures: those of efficacy, legal certainty and justice;s" that is to say, law that
cannot be enforced effectively would be of no consequence; law of which the
substance remains unknown is meaningless; and a legal system that has lost track
of the people's conception of justice is heading toward catastrophe.
These value ideas do not apply in an absolute sense. As a relativist,
Radbruch acknowledged the possibility of a conflict between the essential
substrata ofthe legal idea. For example, legal certainty might require adherence
to unjust laws in spite of their iniquity; but when legally sanctioned injustices
assume such huge proportions that one begins to doubt the clear meaning of the
language used to denote the injustice, legal certainty would fade. The rule could,
through lack of legal certainty, lose its validity, and one would then, according to
Radbruch, be entitled to appeal to das Clbergesetiche Rech s2 a term used by
him to denote a system of natural law.
53
By the same token, a discrepency might arise between the value idea
of justice and the lamws basic idea of effective implementation. If people were
required to obey laws that contradict their sense of justice, then they would
develop a natural tendency to disobey such laws. Those entrusted with the
maintenance of law and order would then be compelled to apply with vigor the
enforcement mechanisms of the law. However, coercive implementation of
laws perceived by a cross-section ofthe population as instances of injustice would
stimulate ratherthan counteract resistance, and then even more coercive means
of law enforcement would be needed to uphold such laws. In this way, the
interchange of resistance against the laws in question and increasing austerity in
s' See RADBRUCH, supra note 49, at 24-33.
52 See i at 32-33; and see also id. at 37, where he proclaimed 'T-1he legal certainty of
an unjust lawthat is guaranteed by positive law, would forfeit this value... if the injustice
embodied in it were to take on such proportions that the legal certainty guaranteed by
positive lawwould no longer be of any consequence. While, therefore, as a general rule
the validity of positive law is justified on account of legal certainty, the possibility remains
that in certain exceptional cases pertaining to unjust laws, such laws might by virtue of
their injustice lose their validity. ("Die durch das positive Recht gewvhreistete
Rechtssicherheit eines u ngerechten Gesetzes verliert diesen Wert... wenn die in ihr
enthaltene Ungerechtigkeit ein solches Mass annimmt, dass demgegenber die durch
posities Recht gewhrleistete Rechtssicherheit nicht ins Gewicht lt. Wenn sie also in
der Regel der Fille die Geltung positiven Rechts durch Rechtssicherheit rechtfertigen
Idsst, so bleibt in gewissen Ausnahme-Sllen horrend ungerechter Gesetze die
Mdgrichkeit, solchen Gesetzen ihrer Ungerechtigkeit wegen die Geltung abzusprechen."
See also GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 353 (1970).
53 See RADBRUCH, supra note 49, at 113-114.
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the implementation thereof, could escalate to the point where law enforcement
can no longer be secured within the confines of the rule of law and the due
process of law. Public censure of a body of laws might soon bring the entire
system into disrepute, and would almost invariably implicate the very authority
of the powers that be. Loss of legitimacy along these lines and in the situation
where maintenance of law and order has become a matter of brute force would
then culminate in govemmental anarchy; and then, warned Radbruch, the entire
r~gime of state and law would be on the brink of collapse.
The bridge between jurisprudential and cultural relativism appears from
the following citation:
The supreme purpose and value ofthe law does not only differ
according to the social conditions of different peoples and
times, but are also subjectively and differently evaluated by
different people according to their (distinct) sense of justice,
idea ofthe state and party-political conviction, religion or world
view.4
In the United States, Padbruch found a faithful disciple in Lon L Fuller,
the Harvard professor who engaged his Oxford colleague, H.LA Hart in the
celebrated Hart-Fuller debate about whether a law, to be valid, must reflect a
certain moral contents Fuller listed altogether eight constituent elements of the
law, which he depicted as '"the internal morality of the law":
-The law must be of general nature and apply equally to all the
subjects of a particular legal system;
-The law must be promulgated and be made known to all its
subjects;
-Laws must not be introduced retroactively;
-The law must be dear and intelligible;
-There must be no contradictions in the law; that is, the law
s Id at 28. C Die h6chsten Zyecke und Werte des Rechts sind nicht nur verschieden
nach Malgabe der sozialen Zustande der verschiedenen V6lker und Zeiten, sie werden
auch subjectiv von Mensch zu Mensch verschieden beurteilt, je nach Rechtsgeffhl,
Staatsauffassung und Partiestandpunkt, Religion oder Weltanschauung.")
5' See Lon L Fuller, PodtMsmn and Fdelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAR'V.
L REV. 630. As to the Hart-Fuller debate, seeJohan D. van der Vyver, LawandMoraliy,
in FIAT lUSTITIA: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OLIVER DENEYS SCHREINER 350, 354-64 (1983).
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must not burden the subjects with conflicting obligations;
-The law must not require the impossible; that is, it must be
practicable;
-The law should remain relatively static; that is, it should not be
changed too frequently;
-Congruence between the law and official action (application
and administration of the law by state authority) is of the
utmost importance.s6
These eight conditions of legality, whether or not they indeed have a
moral base is for purposes of the present survey neither here nor there,5 7
cannot, according to Fuller, be classified in a fixed order, may contradict one
another, need not in all circumstances be applied with the same measure of
fastidiousness, and must occasionally be sacrificed for the sake of other of those
values.5 8 For instance, if a particular rule of law corresponds to the sense of
justice of the community, the principle of publicity and the proscription of
retroactive legislation becomes less compelling; the rule against retroactive
enactments is more important in criminal law than in taxation; if the principle of
publicity has been disregarded, retroactive legislation may become necessary to
remedy that neglect; if the law were often to be amended, the principle of
publicity would have to be applied meticulously. Fuller summarised the purport
of his legal theory in the following words:
[The Utopia of legality cannot be viewed as a situation in
which each desideratum ofthe laws special morality is realized
to perfection. ... In every human pursuit we shall always
encounter the problem of balance at some point as we
traverse the long road that leads from the abyss of total failure
to the heights of human excellence5 9
56 See LON L FULLER, THE MORAULTY OF LAW 46-91 (1964).
7 See H.LA Hart, Book Review78 HAI L REV. 1281, 1283-88 (1965) (reviewing
LON L FULLER, THE MORAUTY OF LAW (1964)). Said Hart, "the dassificaion of these
eight principles as a form of morality breeds confusion." Id at 1284. Or, again, "the
author's insistence on classi)ng these principles of legality as a 'morality' is a source of
confusion both for him and his readers." Id. at 1285.
s See FuLLERsupm note 56, at 41-45, 91-94, 104.
9 /d at 45-46.
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At first glance, these statements seem to constitute an anomaly in Fuller's
teaching. The assumption that circumstances could arise in which a certain
principle may be disregarded or would apply less stringently is apparently in
conflict with the assertion that the same principle constitutes a condition of
legality, that is, an essential requirement for the validity of the law. Fuller,
however, resolved the ostensible anomaly on the basis of relativism.'0 One
should not regard the law as an inflexible or rigid entity that either exists or does
not exist; the existential being of the law may operate more or less, half-and-half,
or so-so. Fuller stated the matter as follows: "f'jhe existence of a legal system
is a matter of degree"; and again: "[B]oth rules of law and legal systems can and
do half exist."2
B. Relatimsm in the Applcation of ConsttuttonalRghty
Within a given political community, choices often have to be made when
different rights come into conflict with one another.
Probably all constitutional systems founded on principles of human rights
protection, consciously or subconsciously, apply a certain hierarchy of values,
dictated in many instances by an unfortunate past history which the Bill of Rights
regime was designed to overcome: in the United States, the First Amendment
freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
religion; in Germany, the protection of human dignity; in Canada, the equal
protection provisions; in South Africa, guarantees of non-discrimination and
human dignity.' Countries where freedoms reign supreme will inevitably
uphold the constitutionality of hate speech and pornography, whereas those
where egalitarian principles and/or human dignity constitute(s) the most basic
norm will feel constrained to outlaw such unbecoming manifestations of freedom
of expression. In developing countries, where the government contracted a
constitutional obligation to orchestrate the reconstruction and development of
society, individual rights to property and to free economic activities may have to
give way to state imposed bona tAde programs designed and executed for the
economic and social upliftment of the people.
60 See id. at 122-23.61 /d at 122.
62 Id
' Seejohan D. van der Vyver, Consth'onal Free Speech and the Law of Defamat'on,
112 S. AFRj L.J. 572,593-94, 595 (1995).
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C. Cultulrelat'm
The question remains whether different human rights perceptions
founded on national or ethnic, cultural, or religious peculiarities should be
permitted to frustrate implementation of the same rights in more or less the
same way throughout the world.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer defined the general approach of cultural relativists
as follows:
[rn general they are inclined to condemn the notion that there
are universal standards by which all cultures may be judged and
to deny the legitimacy of using values taken from Western
culture to judge institutions of non-Western cultures. They
also tend to oppose the idea that human rights norms are
universal.'
There is a general tendency to assume that cultural relativism in
international human rights perceptions is something essentially un-Westem.
Adamantha Pollis and Peter Schwab argue, for example, that the Western
sources of human rights theories, and Western dominance in the formative years
of the United Nations, deprive the concept of human rights of any claim to
universality. Jack Donnelly presupposes that cultural relativism resides in non-
Westem 'traditional communities," such as precolonial African villages, Native
American tribes, and traditional Islamic social systems." Kimberley Schooley
seems to think that communitarianism, a strong group identity, is a sine qua non
of relativist thinking within the human rights discourse.67 She deals exclusively
with the group-oriented relativist approach to human rights of Islamic scholars,
which in itself, of course, does not mean that she would necessarily confine
cultural relativism in the human rights context to Islam.
Cultural relativism in the context of human rights protection is, however,
perceived by many analysts of the concept as an invention of the Muslim world.
64 ANN EuZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1995).
's See Adamantha Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human R'ghts: A Western Consbct WitM
LimitedApplicabty, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, 4
(Adamantha Pollis et a]. eds., 1979).
See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 410.
67 See Kimberley Jounce Schooley, CuetualSowregnt, Islam, and Human R'ghts-
Towarda Communitarian Rewison, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 651, 679 (1994-95).
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Said AmirArjomand thus speaks of "an official 'Islamic attemative"-as embodied
in the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam'-to the (typically
Western) assertion of the universality of human rights.' Earlier, the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights proudly proclaimed in its Preamble that
"Islam gave to mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago. ' '7O
An Islamic politician from Pakistan explained, "[w]hen Muslims speak about
human rights in Islam, they mean rights bestowed by Alah the exalted in the
Holy Koran; rights that are divine, eternal, universal, and absolute; rights that are
guaranteed and protected through the [S]hariah. "7'
The Cairo Declaration proclaimed that'fundamental rights and universal
freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion"' and subordinated
all the rights and freedoms enunciated in the Dedaration to the dictates of Islamic
law which states, U[the Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the
explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration."'
The Declaration makes no allowance for freedom of religion, but
proclaims on the contrary, "Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature. It is
prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man orto exploit his poverty
or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion orto atheism."74
In international relations, Islamic relativism finds practical expression in
reservations subjecting the commitment of some Muslim states under ratified
conventions to the supreme governance of Islamic injunction. In the case, for
example, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,7 a number of Muslim
RqprtednTWENY-FrvE HUMAN RKGHTs DOCUMENTS 190 (1994) [hereinafter Cairo
Declaration].
69 See Amir Arjomand, Re/gos Human Nghts and the Pincile of Legal Pural&m, in
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTVES 331, 345-46
(lohan D. van der Vyver et al. eds., 1996).
7o Uniersa Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (198 1), reprintedin 3 INTERNATIONAL
LAw &WORLD ORDER: BASic DOCUMENTS B.26 (Bums H. Weston ed., 1998)
7, Khan Bahadur Khan, The World of/slam, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORLD
CONGRESS ON REUGioUs LIBERTY 33, 37 (1989).
' Cairo Declaration, supra note 68, preamble.
7 Id. art. 25.
74 Id. art. 10.
' GA. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N.
Doc. A44/49 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (enteredinto force Sept. 2, 1990).
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states7' have entered reservations which in one way or another tst to the
subordination of their responsibilities under the Convention to dictates of the
Shari'ah. Djibouti77 which maintains a certain religious neutrality in its
constitution, promises to respect all religious belies79 and actually prohibits
political prties in the country from identifying themselves with any religion, cult
or religious denonination.n Nevertheless, Djibouti declared upon ratification of
the Childrens' Convention that it did not consider itself bound by any of the
provisions that are incompatible with its religion and traditional values.
Cultural relativism did not remain confined to the Muslim communities
of the world. The United Nations World Conference on Human Rights of 1993
was preceded by three regional preparatory meetings: 0 one for Africa, held in
Tunis on November 2-6, 1992; one for Latin America and the Carribean, held
in San Josh on January 18-22, 1993; and one for the Asia Pacific region, held in
Bangkok on March 29-April 2, 1993. The Bangkok Dedaration8' came out
strongly in support of a "pluralistic approach" to international human rights.
Although it reiterated 'the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human
rights and the need to avoid the application of double standards in the
implementation of human rights and its politicization, and that no violation of
human rights can be justified,' it went on to stress that human rights are only
universal "in nature.' Human rights, it proclaims, "must be considered in the
context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing
in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds." 4
7' Afghanistan, AIgria, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives,
Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, and Syria. United Nations, The UnitedNations
TreatCbgecthn(visited Mar. 7, 1998)<http:/ww.un.org/Depts/reatyAnal/2/new
liles/part-booAv_I I .html>.
SWIlam is the dominant religion in Djibouti. See 1995-1996 NEW AFRICAN YEARBOOK
118 (Alan Rake ed., 1996).
78 See DJIB. CONST. tit. 1, art. I.
79 See i. tit. I, art. 6.
8 See GA Res 46/I16 U.N. GAOR, 75th plen. mtg. (199 1).
"' Reportof 'he Regional Meeting forAsia of the World Conference on Human Rights,
World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, at 293-95, U.N. Doc.
AConf. I 57/ASRM/B-A/CONF. I 57/PC/59.
82 Id 7.
8 See id. 8.
84 Id
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Cultural relativism has also come to permeate the approach to
international human rights of the United States of America.
D. Weak Cultural Relatvism
Before considering the relativistic approach to foreign relations of the
United States, it would perhaps be instructive to draw attention to the relativistic
approach of Jack Donnelly on the problem of cultural relativism.
Donnelly, who depicted his own approach as one of'Weak relativism,"
identified certain "central moral aspirations in nearly all cultures:" life, social order,
protection from arbitrary rule, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment,
the guarantee of a place in the life of the community, and access to an equitable
share ofthe means of subsistance.' He then went on, taking his lead from the
Universal Dedaration of Human Rights, to categorize different human rights, the
mechanism for protecting these "basic, relatively universal core of human nature
and dignity," in a hierarchical order of being more or less prone to cultural
differentiation. The most "basic, very widely shared values," according to his
perception of things," is represented by the protection of life, liberty and the
security of the person, 7 and the proscription of torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.' Perhaps on the same level are the
"seemingly universal ideas" of procedural faimess in the administration of justice:'
access to a court and independent judges, protection against arbitrary arrest and
detention, and the presumption of innocence.' The emphasis in human rights
instruments on equality and non-discrimination,9 ' on the other hand, reflects "an
essentially individualistic modem view of man, state and society."' The right to
privacy93 is, in Donnelly's judgment, "peculiarly modem." Freedom of
8' Donnelly, supra note 44, at 414-15.
8 Seeid. at 415.
87 See id. at 415; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 3.
See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 415; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 5.
9 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 415; see UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 8-Il.
90 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 415-16.
9, See id; see UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 1,2,7.
2 Donnelly, supra note 44, at 415.
9 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 12.
9' Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416.
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movement,95 the right to asylum,9 and the right to a nationality,97 would be
"odd" in traditional societies." The institution of marriage" may be said to be
quite universal, but the notion of "free and full consent of the intending
spouses"" is "peculiarly modem."'0' Private property'0 is indeed "of some
universal validity," but not as far as ownership of the means of production is
concerned."° 3 The economic and social rights listed in the Universal
Declaration" 4 are "directed against the modem state" and "correspond to the
individualization of the person in modem sodety.""
Donnellythus sought to uncover "greater cultural relativit/"° 6 in some
rights than in others, but nevertheless proclaimed a rebuttable presumption that
the rights and freedoms enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
apply universally.'" The presumption may be rebutted by demonstrating (a) that
violation ofthe concerned right is not standard in the society seeking rebuttal; (b)
that the right is not considered basic in that society; or (c) that the right is
protected by alternative mechanisms. "
IIl. THE UNrrED STATES AND CULTURAL RELATMSm
The United States of America has rightly been hailed as the leader in the
world in regard to constitutional mechanisms for the guaranteed protection of
human rights. Through several amendments to its Federal Constitution of
1789," °9 it innovated the idea of safeguarding the fundamental rights and
9 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 13.
1 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 14.
9 See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 15.
"' See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416.
See id.; see UDHI Psupra note 4, art. 16.
,o Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416; see UDHR, supra note 4, art. 16(2).
,o1 Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416.
,o Seeid.;seeUDHRsupranote4,atart. 17.
'o See Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416.
,04 See UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 22-27.
'0 Donnelly, supra note 44, at 416.
I 1dat 418.
107 See iat 417.
1o8 See id
109 1 Stat. 97 (1845).
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freedoms of the individual against the legislative and executive powers of
govemment in a system succinctly depicted by one of its Supreme Court justices
in language borrowed mostly from the Declaration of Independence:
The theory upon which our political institutions rest [sic] is, that
all men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that in the pursuit
of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike
open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all
are equal before the law."'
As a matter of political science, the American Constitution may indeed
fall short of generally accepted norms of good government, as evidenced, for
example, by the sweeping language of its Bill of Rights, substitution of judicial
supremacy for the principle of constitutionality, unprincipled application of
jurisprudence founded on a slippery'state action" doctrine, inconsistencies in the
interpretation policies of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the sacrifice,
through the joint effect of these constitutional characteristics, of the directive
norms of legal certainty. In most instances, though, these shortcomings were put
to good use in order to arrive at a more or less judicious outcome.
In the arena of international human rights, American performance has
been less fortunate. The United States has been particularly reluctant in ratifying
international human rights instruments. Its representatives often took an active
part in the drafting of human rights treaties, mostly taking a particularly
conservative stand, with internal political interests as a primary guide.
Proponents of international human rights standards almost invariably pursue
compromises that would satisfy American demands, if for no other reason than
simply because the United States happens to carry the purse for implementation
expenditures. The result is quite often a mediocre convention with lukewarm
enforcement procedures, and subsequently, when ratification is called for,
Washington simply won't play ball!
The United States has in recent years ratified a number of international
human rights treaties: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
... Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,321-22 (1867).
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Crime of Genocide (1948)"' in 1986; 12the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966)'.. in 1992; .4 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)' s in 1994;' 16 and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 17 in
1994.1a
It is perhaps worth noting that the Convention on the Rights of the
Child".9 has been ratified by all but two Member States of the United Nations
and Switzerland. Those two Member States are Somalia and the United States.
Wide acceptance of the Children's Convention is further evidenced by the fact
that it was adopted without a vote being taken and entered into force (on
September 2, 1990) in the record-breaking short period of eleven months after
its adoption. There are no indications that the United States intends to ratify the
Convention soon. The United States, furthermore, has no intention whatsoever
to ratify the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966),2" and
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women 12 is currently on hold.
Ratification by the United States of the human rights covenant and
conventions mentioned above was accompanied by a bundle of reservations,
"' GA Res.260(),U.N.GAOR,3rdSess., pt. I *at 174, U.N. Doc.A/810(1948).78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 195 1) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
e2 Se 132 CoNG. REc.S1355 (dailyed. Feb. 19, 1986).
"3 GA. Res. 2200A (XX]), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
"4 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
"S GA Res. 39/46, Anex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 5 1, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A39/51 (1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into forceJune 26, 1987) [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
116 SeeCoNG. REc. S17486 (dailyed. Oct.27, 1994).
117 GA. Res. 2106(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965) 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter
Convention on Racial Discrimination].
I'l8 See 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994).
".9 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 75.
'20 GA Res. 2200 A (XX0 ), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
N6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
'2' GA. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
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understandings and declarations (RUD's), the substance of which may be
reduced to a single proposition; the United States shall abide by only those
provisions which are in conformity with existing American law and constitutional
institutions. In her analysis of the RUD's that conditioned ratification by the
United States ofthe Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Christy Green speaks
of "Swiss cheese' treaty making" ' and likens it to the Russian Matrioshkas,
oblong wooden figures that can be twisted apart at the middle to reveal any
number of smaller dolls, requiring interpreters "to penetrate layer upon layer of
reservations, understandings, and declarations that pose progressively greater
obstacles to achieving the goals of the treaty.""m
Louis Henkin summarized as follows the "principles" upon which the
United States Senate adheres to when it comes to the ratification of international
human rights instruments:
I. The United States will not undertake anytreaty obligation
that it will not be able to carry out because it is inconsistent
with the United States Constitution.
2. United States adherence to an international human rights
treaty should not effect, or promise, change in existing United
States law or practice.
3. The United States will not submit to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to decide disputes as to the
interpretation or application of hunan rights conventions.
4. Every human rights treaty to which the United States
adheres should be subject to a "federalism clause" so that the
United States could leave implementation of the convention
largely to the states.
5. Every international human rights agreement should be "non-
self-executing."24
, M. Christian Green, The Wa shka" Srategy. US Evasion of the Spirit of the
International Covenant on Cii and PoliticalRghts, 10 S. AF.J. HUM. RTs. 357, 358
(1994).
'2 Id. at 358-59.
'24 Louis Henldn, US ahicaion ofHuman RNghts Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
&icke, 89 AM.J. INT'L L 341,341 (1995).
Vol. 4
1998 UNIVERSALITY AND RELATIVITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69
A The Constuonal Constr'nt
It stands to reason that the internal or constitutional powers of any
government must be exercised subject to existing constitutional constraints.
However, the United States also elected to subject its international obligation to
limitations that might be, or ought to be, of municipal significance only. In doing
so, the United States has set a bad example that may be, and indeed often is,
mimicked by countries whose respective constitutions, from the human rights
point of view, leave much to be desired.
In the ratification document pertaining to the Genocide Convention,1 25
the United States expressly proclaimed, "That nothing in the Convention
requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America
prohibited bythe Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United
States."
In subsequent ratification instruments, a similar provision was inserted
as a Senate instruction that did not constitute part of the instrument of ratification
as such; 26 and in the case of the Torture Convention, the President of the
United States was instructed not to deposit the instrument of ratification before
having informed all existing and prospective ratifying parties to the Convention
thatthe United States will not be required or permitted to pass legislation or take
action prohibited by its Constitution as interpreted bythe United States.' 27 The
change of strategy was likely prompted bythe reaction and adverse comments
of several State Parties to the reservation in the Genocide ratification instrument
prodaiming the supremacy of the United States Constitution."
Reservations pertaining to certain particular constitutional guarantees
include the protection of free speech and the proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment
The International Covenant on CMI and Political Rights mandates State
Parties to outlaw in their municipal legal systems any propaganda for war, and the
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility
or violence. 29 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
,25 See 132 CONG. REc. S 1355, 1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19,1986) (Reservation 1(2)).
12 See 138 CoNG. REc. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) ( IV); see also Convention on
Racial Discrimination, supra note 117.
'27 See 136 CONG. REc. SI 7486, 17488 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)(1 IV).
'2' See FRANK NEWmAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNAT1OrNAL HuMAN RIGHTs: LAW,
POLICYAND PROCESS 39 (1996).
'29 See ICCPR, supranote 113, art. 20.
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Discrimination directs State Parties to condemn all propaganda of racial
superiority orof racial hatred and discrimination. 3' In view of First Amendment
free speech jurisprudence, reservations were included in the concerned
instruments of ratification to exclude the binding force of these provisions as far
as the United States is concerned.' 3'
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights132 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment'33 prohibit "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
outlaws "cruel and unusual punishments only. Here, again, reservations
included in the instruments of ratification cutthe international criteria down to the
size dictated by American constitutional interpretations. 34
The free speech reservations are unfortunate, but understandable. In
the United States, the First Amendment freedoms for very special historical
reasons manifest the Grundnorm of the entire system of constitutional rights
protection.3 s However, that is not the case as far as the limited scope of the
Eighth Amendment is concerned. It is reasonable to assume that ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the Torture
Convention without subordinatingtheir "punishment or treatment" provisions to
existing American jurisprudence might have inspired the further judicial
development of the criminal justice system of the United States so as to bring it
into conformity with international standards. The reservations in question were
presumably intended, or would in any event serve, to stifle such development.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 36 in several of its provisions, addresses discriminatory practices
by persons and institutions other than the state. For example, Article 2(l Xc)
instructs State Parties "to bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including
legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any person,
,a See Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 117, art. 4.
13, See 138 CONG. REc. S4781, 4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation I(I)); see
a/o id, Declaration 111(2); 140 CONG. REC. S7634, (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (Reservation
(1)).
'32 SeelCCPR, supranote 113, art. 7.
" See Convention Against Torture, supranote I 15, art. 16(I).
'34 See 138 CONG. REc. S4781, 4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation 1(3)); 136
CONG. REc. S 17486, (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1994) (Reservation 1(2)).
,3 Seevan der Vyver, supra note 63.
' Convention on Racial Discrimination, supranote 117.
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group or organization." The United States entered a reservation to this and
other similar provisions, upholding the application policy of the U.S. Supreme
Court founded on the notion of "state action." 37 This seems quite unnecessary,
since there is authority for the proposition that instances of "private" racial
discrimination do come within the confines of the Thirteenth (anti-slavery)
Amendment, which is not hampered by a "state action" application criterion. 138
Many instances of racial discrimination in the private sphere have furthermore
been outlawed in the United States by various Civil Rights Acts.
B. The Salience of Ei sngLaws and Pracices
The American RUD's go well beyond constitutionally defined limitations
of state action. The United States will not bind itself to any human rights norm
that contradicts, or is not precisely in conformity with, existing federal or state
law, including federal and state law that have not been enacted to give effect to
Bill of Rights directives.
Artide 15.1 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 39
proclaims that, should a lighter sentence for a particular offense be prescribed by
law subsequent to the commission of that offense, the accused should be given
the benefit of the lighter sentence. Not so in the United States. There the
courts would normally impose the sentence that was in place at the time the
offence was committed. A reservation upholding this practice was entered by
the United States. 4°
In the United States, juvenile offenders may be tried as though they
were adults at the time a particular crime was committed. A reservation to
American ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights endorsed the
intention of the United States to uphold this practice.' 4'
The United States is adamant about retaining the death penalty,4'
inciuding juvenile executions.'43
The United States would not unconditionally commit itself to separating
,37 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (daily ed.June 24, 1994) (Understanding II).
'3 SeeJones v. Alred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
'3' See ICCPP, supra note 113, art. 7.
,40 See 138 CoNG. REc. S4781, 4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation 1(4)).
... See id at Reservation 1(5).
142 See 136 CONG. REc. SI 7486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understanding 11(4)).
,43 See 138 CONG. REc. S478 I, 4783, (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation 1(2)).
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unconvicted detainees from convicted prisoners;' 44 and whereas international
directives emphasize reformation and social rehabilitation as legitimate
penitentiary objectives,' the .United States persisted in also applying
punishments as a deterrent and as a means of incapacitating prisoners.'46
In general, the protection to be afforded to juveniles in terms of the
International Covenant on CMI and Political Rights147 will not apply, as far as the
United States is concerned, to persons under the age of 18 years who
volunteered for military service.'48
C. Junsdicton ofintemabonal Trbunals
In 1946, the United States submitted to the compulsory ipso fcto
jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice (IC]) in terms of Article 36(2) of
the Statute of the IC],' 49 which means in effect that international disputes
between the United States and any other state that was also subject to the
compulsory icso kctojurisdiction of the ICJ could be brought before that Court
by either party without any further agreement Following the judgment of the
IC] in the Case Concerning Milirt, and Parn/ilitba Acgibs In and Against
NkragUa, °50 which found the United States to have acted in breach of
international law, President Ronald Reagan, on October 7, 1985, terminated the
compulsory jurisdiction of the IC] over the United States with effect six months
fromthatdate. The United States could henceforth on an adhocbasis agree to
the jurisdiction of the IC] in any international dispute to which it is a party.
Some international human rights treaties, including the Genocide
Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, make provision for disputes between State Parties emanating
fromthe treatyto be referred to the IC]. The United States will have nothing of
it, but may agree on an adhoc basis to submit itself to IC] jurisdiction.'' The
'" See id. at Understanding 11(3).
141 See ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 10(3).
46 See 138 CoNG. REc. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Understanding 11(4)).
'47 See ICCPR, supra note 113, arts. 10(2) and 14(4).
,41 See 138 CONG. REc. S478 I, 4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Reservation 1(5)).
'49 STAT. OF I.C.J. art. 36(2) (1945).
"s Nicaraguav. United States (Merits), 1996 I.C.J. 14.
Is' See 132 CONG. REc. S1355, 1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19 1986) (Reservation (I)); see
also id. at 1378 (Understanding 11(5)); see 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (daily ed. June 24,
1994) (Reservation 1(3)).
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arbitration clause in the Torture Convention is also not binding on the United
States.15
2
These reservations are most unfortunate. In the early 1950's, the ICJ
was called upon to decide whether reservations to the Genocide Convention
were at all feasible. The Court advised that they were, provided a particular
reservation did not defeat the olject and purpose of the Convention.'5 3
Although reservations to the Genocide Convention entered bythe United States
do not nullifythe Convention's objectives, " they do deprive the Convention of
its enforcement life line.5 s The same applies to conditions under which the
United States ratified, and could escape enforcement of, the Convention on
Racial Discrimination and the Torture Convention. Louis Henkin strongly
condemned the United States for having refused to subject itself to international
adjudication."5 6 In the current debates in the United Nations for the
establishment of an International Criminal Court, the United States has become
notorious for insisting that all prosecutions in the Court to be established be
sanctioned by the Security Council, an eventuality that would allow the United
States to veto the prosecution of its own officials!
it should be noted, on the other hand, that the United States did submit
to the facultative interstate adversarial procedures provided for in the
International Convention on CMI and Political Rights,' and the Torture
Convention.' The interstate adversarial procedure provided for in the
Convention on the Bimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination5 9 is in any
event not optional.' 60
152 See 136 CoNG. REc. S 17486, 17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Reservation 1(2)).
" See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.CJ.
13.
's See Nicholas F. Kourtis &Joseph M. Titlebaum, Interat'onal Convention on the
Preention and Punishment of the Qime of Genocde: United States Senate Grant of
Adk'ce and Consent to Riffcation, I HAw. Hum. RTs.Y.B. 227,231 (1988).
"' Seeia at 234; and see ao LavrenceJ. LeBlanc, The I, the Genodde Convention,
and the United States, 6 Wisc. INrL LJ. 43 (1987).
"s See Henkin, supra note 124, at 349.
'17 See 138 CONG. REc. S4781, 4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Declaration 111(3)).
However, the United Slates did not ratifythe Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Cii
and Political Rights (1976), which makes provision for an individual complaints procedure.
,m See 136 CoNG. REc. S17486, 17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990) (Declaration 111(2)).
, Convention on Racial Descrimination, supra note 117, art. Ill.
'60 The United States did not subscnbeto the facultative individual complaints procedure
of this Convention under article 14.
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. Federalism
It has likewise become standard practice for the United States to enter
RUD's aimed at safeguarding the states from intrusions on their areas of
jurisdiction by the federal authorities through the treaty powers vested in the
President and the Senate.'
6 1
The United States is perhaps in a unique position in the world today in
that its federal Bill of Rights does not deal comprehensively with the protection
of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. American federalism is
furthermore the reverse of most systems for the devolution of political power.
In the United States, the powers vested in the federal political authorities are
circumscribed in the Constitution, and all residual powers vest in the state
(regional) authorities. The protection of some of the most basic rights and
freedoms of the individual has thus come to be the responsibility of the states.
This applies, among other things, to the protection of the most basic of
all freedoms, the right to life. It is left to the states to authorize orto proscribe
the death penalty; and it is within the province of the states to uphold juvenile
executions and to determine at what age a person may become competent to
be sentenced to death. Reservations and understandings in respect of the death
penalty 62 and juvenile executions"6 have been prompted with the federal
distribution of powers in mind.
Since different regional standards of protection in respect of certain basic
human rights apply in the United States, the country has come under fire for
denyingto persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. In the
Case of Roach and Pinkerton,'" the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights condemned juvenile executions in the United States for exactly that
reason:
Forthe federal Government of the United States to leave the
issue ofthe application of the death penalty to juveniles to the
discretion of State officials results in a patchwork scheme of
legislation which makes the severity of the punishment
161 See 138 CONG. REC S4781, 4784 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (Understanding 11(5)); see
136 CoNG. REc. S 17486, 17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understanding 11(5)); see 140
CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (Understanding II).
'62 See 136 CONG. REc. S 17486, 17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Understanding 11(4)).
'6 See 138 CoNG. REc_ S4781, 4783 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (Reservation 1 (2)).
'64 Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.P 15 1, OEser. L/V/ 11.7 1, doc. 9 rev. I (1987).
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dependent, not, primarily, on the nature of the crime
committed, but on the location where it was committed.
Ceding to state legislatures the determination of whether a
juvenile may be executed is not of the same category as
granting states the discretion to determine the age of majority
for purposes of purchasing alcoholic beverages or consenting
to matrimony. The failure of the federal government to
preemptthe states as regards this most fundamental right-the
right to life- results in a pattern of legislative arbitrariness
throughout the United States which results in the arbitrary
deprivation of life and inequality before the law, contrary to
Article I [the right to life] and II [the right to equality before the
law] of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, respectively."
Federalism has also provided an excuse for the United States not to
uphold the principle against double jeopardy in its internal criminal justice system.
Conviction or acquittal in a state court for a particular offense does not render
obsolete a second trial under the federal criminal justice system based on exactly
the same set of facts, and vice versa An understanding in the document of
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights endorsed
this deviation in the United States from the internationally recognized norm
against double jeopardy.'"
E Intemadonal Lawas Part ofthe Lawofthe Land
In the United States, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority ofthe United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."' 67 In
virtue ofthis provision, international treaties are, as a general rule, self-executing
in the United States; that is to say, their provisions become part of the municipal
law of the country without further ado. Self-executingtreaties are subordinate
to the Constitution, equal in status to federal law, and superior to state law:
should a self-executing treaty provision be in conflict with the Constitution, then
the treaty provision will be null and void in the United States; should the treaty
16' Id. at 173.
'66 See 138 CoNG. REC. S4781, 4783-4 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (Understanding 11(4)).
167 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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provision contradict a federal law, the one later in date will remain valid, and a
treaty provision will trump a conflicting state law.
A treaty will be self-executing if it is intended by the parties to create
municipally enforceable rights and its provisions are sufficiently precise to be
legally executed; however, the status of international treaties and customary
law Within the municipal legal system of states is governed by the constitutional
law of the state concerned, and not by international law. In the United States,
certain considerations may render a treaty non-self-executing. For example, if
the treaty addresses a subject matter which by virtue of the Constitution falls.
within the jurisdiction of Congress, " or if the treaty requires action to be taken
by the federal government, ' then the treaty will not automatically become part
of the municipal legal system.
In the 1950's, a certain Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an
amendment to the United States Constitution that would have rendered all
international treaties non-self-executing in the United States and would even
have prevented congressional legislation to implement human rights treaties.'71
The BrickerAmendmentwas defeated, but, according to Louis Henkin, its ghost
lived on and was resurrected by the package of RUD's which left '"the Covenant
[on Civil and Political Rights] without any life in the United States. " '
It has become standard practice for the United States to add a
Declaration to its instruments of ratification of human rights treaties rendering
those treaties non-self-executing."I Moreover, no effort has been made to
enact legislation that would incorporate any of the concerned human rights
norms into the municipal law of the United States.
" See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Forevrd: Symposium on
PaflaentayPa'f pabnh the -a&&ngand Operaton of Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
293,295 (1992).
169 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
111 cmt. i (1987).
,70 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
,7, See Henkin, supra note 124, at 348-49.
'72 Id at 349.
'3 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, 4784 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (Declaration 111(l)); see
136 CONG. REC. S 17486, 17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Declaration 111(l)); see 140
CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed.June 24,1994) (Declaration III).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper was intended to demonstrate that the American approach
to international human rights is as much a manifestion of cultural relativism as any
other sectional approach to international human rights founded on national or
ethnic, cultural or religious peculiarities. American relativism, furthermore, also
serves to obstructthe United Nations' resolve to promote unAersalrespect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
Kimberley Schooley sounded a particularly pessimistic note, that is, from
the perspective of the universalist standpoint, when she spoke of the futility of
attempts to incorporate "universal" human rights norms into a pre-existing
culture.' 74 Her premise suggests that there simply are no universally valid, or at
least universally recognized, values. Pollis and Schwab'75 seem to share those
sentiments, founded in theirexposition of the subject on the assumption that the
values uncovered in a particular region of the world could not, or would never,
include ones with global appeal. The relativistic approach to the problem of
relativism expounded by Jack Donnelly, on the other hand, does claim more or
less universal validity for at least the most basic rights derived from "a core of
'human nature' and dignity. 76
The ratification policy of the United States has been severely criticized
bynAmerican human rights scholars'n and NGO's. 78 Assuming that the United
Nations standards of human rights protection are 'Westem" in nature, it is difficult
to understand why the country perceived to be the leading force in that region
of the world should experience problems with adhering to those standards.
Riesenfeld and Abbott noted that the RUD's insisted upon by the Senate as
conditions for ratification of human rights treaties "threaten to undermine the
credibility of U.S. participation in the international legal process."'" Christy
Green, in the same vein, observed:
,7' See Schooley, supra note 67, at 713.
't Pollis & Schwab, supra note 65, at 4.
176 Donnelly, supranote 44, at 415-16.
'n See e.g., Henkin, supra note 124, at 341; see aso Green supra note 122, at 357,
358.
" See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Statement on US. Ratifcatdon of
the Covenant on wIandPoltcalnghts, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 125 (1993).
1' Riesenfeld &Abbott, supra note 168, at 293.
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The United States has been the target of international criticism
not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use
its position in the world to set a good example for others. The
United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard
of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory,
but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the
improvement of rights in the word community rather than
grudgngly ratfying treaties, while at the same time concealing
their goals within layer upon layer of qualifications.'so
It should also not pass unnoticed that, within the domestic arena of the
American structures of power, the ratification strategies insisted on by the Senate
in effect vest in the treaty making apparatus of the State a competence to
manipulate the self-executing and non-self-executing character of human rights
conventions,'6 ' and in so doing, to frustrate the constitutional directive
proclaiming ratified treaties to be the supreme law of the land." The package
of RUD's also vests control over the interpretation of "the supreme law of the
land" in the President and Senate." There are, I am sure, some separation of
powers arguments to be made here, but that can best be left to American
constitutional experts to sort out.
It might well be that deviations from internationally recognized standards
of human rights protection in the case ofthe United States are less reprehensible
than those current in, for example, China orArab states that insist on a relativistic
approach to international human rights."8 However, that judgment is in itself
informed by a Western bias. There is, on the other side of the coin, a body of
opinion in the Muslim world maintaining that relative leniency in the penal
policies of countries, which emphasize procedural due process as the foundation
of human rights protection, tends to promote rather than counteract violations
of substantive human rights.
What is good for the goose, must be good for the gander. If universal
faith in human rights is to be the norm, that must apply to the East and the West,
to the South and the North, including the United States of America.
, Green, supra note 122, at 370-7 1.
,8, See Piesenfeld &Abbott, supra note 168, at 295-99.
'8 See U.S. CoNST. art. VI.
' See Riesenfeld &Abbott, supra note 168, at 299-302.
,S 5eeGreen, supranote 122, at 370.
